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This paper investigates the role that the entry and exit of heterogeneous firms plays in shaping aggregate
fluctuations in economic activity. In so doing, it develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model in which procyclical entry and countercyclical exit along a real business cycle lead to endogenous
cyclical movements in average firm productivity. These movements stem from a composition effect
due to the reallocation of market shares among firms with different levels of efficiency and affect the
propagation of exogenous technological shocks. Numerical analysis suggests that existing models
with representative firms may overstate the actual role of procyclical entry and exit in imperfectly
competitive markets as a propagation mechanism of exogenous technology shocks. The reason is that
procyclical entry and countercyclical exit disproportionately involve less efficiency firms whose impact
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This paper investigates the role that the entry and exit of heterogeneous ￿rms
play in shaping the aggregate ￿ uctuations of economic activity. In so doing, it
develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which procyclical
entry and countercyclical exit along a real business cycle lead to endogenous
cyclical movements in average ￿rm productivity that a⁄ect the propagation of
exogenous technological shocks.
These endogenous cyclical movements stem from a composition e⁄ect due
to the reallocation of market shares among ￿rms with di⁄erent levels of e¢ -
ciency. Reallocation happens at the extensive margins due to entry and exit
that disproportionately involve less e¢ cient ￿rms. It also happens at the in-
tensive margin as incumbents with di⁄erent e¢ ciency levels perceive di⁄erent
changes in demand elasticity even if faced with the same aggregate shock.
The model features endogenous markups. Whether these move on average
pro- or counter-cyclically depends on the balance between two opposing e⁄ects
as the elasticity of demand varies along the business cycle for two reasons. First,
it increases with the number of competitors. As entry is procyclical and exit
is countercyclical, the resulting ￿ uctuations in net business creation would lead
to countercyclical markups. Second, the elasticity of demand also increases
with the average e¢ ciency of competitors. As entry and exit disproportionately
involve less e¢ cient ￿rms, the resulting countercyclical ￿ uctuations in average
￿rm e¢ ciency would generate pro-cyclical markups. Accordingly, which e⁄ect
eventually dominates depends on the chosen parametrization of the distribution
of ￿rm heterogeneity and the speed at which the two e⁄ects materialize in the
model.
The present paper is related to three main traditions in the macroeconomic
literature. The ￿rst tradition concerns the models of creative destruction and,
in particular, their implications in terms of "cleansing" during recessions. As
discussed by Caballero and Hammour (1994), the key premise of these models
is that the continuous process of creation and destruction of production units
that results from product and process innovation is essential for understanding
not only growth, but also business cycles. In their vintage model with het-
erogeneous technologies, Caballero and Hammour (1994) show that industries
undergoing continuous creative destruction accommodate demand ￿ uctuations
during the business cycle by varying the rates at which more e¢ cient production
units are created and less e¢ cient ones are destroyed. As their model is able
to generate greater cyclicality of destruction than creation, recessions can be
interpreted as times of ￿cleansing￿ , when less e¢ cient techniques and products
are expelled from the market. Caballero and Hammour (1994) argue that this
di⁄erential cyclicality is consistent with the empirical patterns of job creation
and job destruction reported, for instance, by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990,
1992).
In the second tradition, search models of unemployment with endogenous job
separation ￿ la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) generate an analogous cleans-
ing e⁄ect in the labor market when matches are heterogeneous. This is due to
2the presence of countercyclical selectivity in the decision whether to continue a
match, implying that labor productivity in the endogenous separations model
responds less than one-to-one to aggregate productivity shocks. These models
shed light on the apparent weak cyclicality of real wages by stressing a com-
position e⁄ect for workers analogous to the one for techniques highlighted by
Caballero and Hammour (1994): as less-skilled workers are more vulnerable to
layo⁄s, they account for a smaller share of employment at business cycle troughs
than at business cycle peaks. These compositional changes induce a counter-
cyclical bias in the aggregate real wage despite procyclical labor productivity
(Abraham and Haltiwanger, 1995). The magnitude of new hires and job sep-
arations during the business cycle draws attention to questions of search and
matching, providing strong motivation for theories of frictional unemployment
(Davis, Faberman and Haltiwanger, 2006).
The third and closest tradition to the methodological approach of the present
paper highlights the importance of imperfect competition for understanding the
amplitude of the business cycle. Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1992, 1995)
investigate the implications of oligopoly arguing that countercyclical movements
in markups due to implicit collusive behaviour magnify the ￿ uctuations of aggre-
gate economic activity. Gali (1994) shows that, when ￿rms face demands from
di⁄erent sources, also variations in demand composition can generate cyclical
movements in markups. These works take the number of competitors as ￿xed.
More recently, Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) argue that cyclical variations
in the number of competitors leading to countercyclical markups can act as a
powerful propagation mechanism of technology shocks. In Bilbiie, Ghironi and
Melitz (2007) countercyclical markups coexist with procyclical pro￿ts, a feature
of the data that previous models had a hard time to explain, as discussed, for
instance, by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). All these works assume repre-
sentative ￿rms.
Di⁄erently from these contributions the present paper introduces ￿rm het-
erogeneity and shows that entry and exit a⁄ect the elasticity of demand not only
because of the implied variations in the number of competitors but also because
of the resulting changes in the average e¢ ciency of competitors. This way it
generates a composition e⁄ect that is reminiscent of the one highlighted by the
aforementioned ￿ ow approach to the labor market. It also yields a cleansing
e⁄ect that is analogous to the one stressed by the literature on creative destruc-
tion.
This is achieved by formulating a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium
growth model in the spirit of Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2007). These authors
propose a discrete-time, stochastic, general equilibrium version of a two-sector
variety-based growth model with representative ￿rms ￿ la Grossman and Help-
man (1991). This is used to focus on the business cycle very much like the
textbook exogenous growth model is used in the real business cycle literature.
Ghironi and Melitz (2005) introduce ￿rm heterogeneity in a similar framework
but abstract from the business cycle implications of entry and exit, focusing
instead on how selection into export status a⁄ects real exchange rate adjust-
ment. They also assume a constant elasticity of demand and, therefore, constant
3markups.
In the two-sector model ￿ la Grossman and Helpman (1991) proposed in the
present paper a sector is devoted to capital accumulation and employs labor un-
der constant returns to scale and perfect competition. The other sector supplies
an array of horizontally di⁄erentiated products under increasing returns to scale
and monopolistic competition. Each product is o⁄ered by a ￿rm employing a
￿xed amount of capital and a variable amount of labor. Firms are heterogeneous
with respect to this variable amount. Heterogeneity is itself endogenous as in
Melitz (2003). To enter the market ￿rms have to hire the required ￿xed amount
of capital. After paying the corresponding rental price, they draw their variable
unit labor requirements (the inverse of their labor productivity or "e¢ ciency")
from some common probability distribution. Then, knowing their own labor
productivity and the productivity of their potential competitors, they decide
whether to start producing or to exit. The exit decision obeys a cuto⁄ rule of
survival: only entrants with high enough labor productivity become producers;
the other entrants leave the market without even starting production.
On the demand side, the proposed model borrows its instantaneous util-
ity function from the static setup of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). However,
by removing the linear component of their quasi-linear quadratic function, it
crucially introduces income e⁄ects and variable marginal utility of income as
in Neary (2007). The resulting demand system exhibits variable elasticity with
less productive ￿rms facing higher demand elasticity than more productive ones.
Accordingly, they charge lower markups. This is not enough to o⁄set their ine¢ -
ciency, so they quote higher prices and are smaller in terms of output, revenues,
and pro￿ts. All these implications comply with the empirical evidence recently
collected, for example, in the trade literature (Tybout, 2003; Bernard, Jensen,
Redding and Schott, 2007).
The focus of the analysis is on how the proposed model reacts to exogenous
technology shocks that change the number of e¢ ciency units per worker. The
main result is that on impact more e¢ ciency units per worker make survival
easier for a larger number of less e¢ cient ￿rms. Accordingly, the number of
producers increases but their average e¢ ciency falls, leading to higher average
price and average markup as well as lower industry concentration and average
output per ￿rm. After impact, as capital begins to accumulate, the number of
entrants starts growing. Survival becomes tougher, triggering ￿rm exit until the
number of producers, their average e¢ ciency, price, markup and size together
with industry concentration go back to their long run levels. The initial wave
of entry just after capital starts accumulating is strong enough to impose a J-
shaped adjustment to average ￿rm e¢ ciency, markup and price: after impact
average e¢ ciency rises above its long run level, hence approaching it from above;
average markup and price fall below their long run levels before approaching
them from below.
As new producers and quitters are less e¢ cient than incumbents, during
business cycle upswings on impact there is more entry, more survival after entry,
and surviving ￿rms are on average less e¢ cient and smaller. The opposite is
true during downswings. Hence, the impact of changing the number of e¢ ciency
4units per worker on aggregate output per worker and welfare is reduced by the
pro-cyclical entry and the countercyclical exit of less e¢ cient ￿rms. Due to
variable demand elasticity, such a dampening e⁄ect of ￿rm selection on aggregate
productivity and welfare works also through a second channel. Holding the
number of incumbents constant, in an upswing industry concentration decreases
as market shares are reallocated towards less e¢ cient ￿rms due to the fact that
the elasticity of demand falls more for high-price ￿rms than for low-price ones.
In a downswing the opposite happens. This second channel would be muted if
demand exhibited constant elasticity as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
The dampening e⁄ect of ￿rm selection depends on the degree of ￿rm het-
erogeneity: the impact of changing the number of e¢ ciency units per worker
on aggregate output per worker and welfare is stronger the less heterogeneous
￿rms are. This reveals a way through which microeconomic heterogeneity may
crucially a⁄ect the propagation of shocks at the aggregate level. Speci￿cally,
it implies that existing models with representative ￿rms (such as the ones by
Jaimovich and Floetotto, 2008, and Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz, 2007) may
overstate the actual role of procyclical entry and exit in imperfectly competi-
tive markets as a propagation mechanism of technology shocks. The reason is
that procyclical entry and countercyclical exit disproportionately involve less
e¢ ciency ￿rms whose impact on aggregates is hampered by their smaller size.
As ine¢ cient ￿rms are typically small, it may be argued that variations in
their number are potentially of limited practical relevance for aggregate ￿ uc-
tuations. This is not what the present ￿ndings imply. Indeed, as argued by
Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008), variations in the number of ￿rms are only one
of the channels that generate actual changes in the number of competitors. In
particular, a new establishment or franchise by an existing ￿rm increases the
number of competitors without a⁄ecting the number of active ￿rms. Based on
quarterly data from 1992 to 2005 for the US, Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008)
￿nd that the average fraction of quarterly gross job-gains (job-losses) that can
be explained by the opening (closing) of establishments is about 20%. Similarly,
around a third of the cyclical volatility of the job-gains (job-losses) comes from
opening (closing) establishments. In the same vein, Broda and Weinstein (2007)
￿nd that net product creation is strongly procyclical. This provides evidence for
a sizable variation in the number of competitors at the business cycle frequency
as long as one adopts a loose interpretation of entry and exit that includes not
only ￿rms but also their portfolios of establishments, franchises, and products.
Additional supportive evidence along these lines is gathered by Bilbiie, Ghironi
and Melitz (2007). On the other hand, it is worthwhile stressing that entry and
exit do not represent the only way through which competitive pressures vary
in the present paper: even if entry and exit were blocked, market shares would
still be reallocated across heterogeneous incumbents due to variable demand
elasticity, thus leading to compositional changes at the aggregate level. What
the ￿ndings in the present paper do imply is, instead, that the role of entry and
exit as a propagation mechanism of technology shocks cannot be fully assessed
without simultaneously considering ￿rm heterogeneity.
The rest of the paper is organized in ￿ve additional sections. Section 2 lays
5down the model. Section 3 characterizes its equilibrium. Section 4 solves for its
steady state and discusses its comparative statics properties. Section 4 studies
the transitionary dynamics around the steady state in the presence of technology
shocks. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Endowments
There are L identical workers each supplying zs e¢ ciency units of labor inelas-
tically every period. Accordingly, Ls = Lzs is the number of e¢ ciency units
of labor available each period and zs can be interpreted as an aggregate labor
productivity shock. At any time s, there are also Ks units of capital owned
by workers. Whereas the labor stock is exogenously given, the capital stock is
endogenously accumulated.
2.2 Preferences
Workers￿individual preferences are captured by the following intertemporal ex-
pected utility function
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where ￿ 2 (0;1) denotes the rate of time preference and instantaneous utility is
de￿ned over a continuum of horizontally di⁄erentiated products
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with Ns and qc
s(!) respectively denoting the measure ("number") of available
products and the individual consumption level of product !. Parameters are all
positive with ￿ measuring product di⁄erentiation.
There is free borrowing and lending on a perfect ￿nancial market where
bonds and capital are freely traded. Intertemporal utility (1) is maximized
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s(!)d! is expenditures on the consumption of the
di⁄erentiated products with ps(!) denoting the price of product !. Iterating
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There are two sectors, one supplying the di⁄erentiated products and the other
supplying additional units of capital. The di⁄erentiated products are supplied
by monopolistically competitive ￿rms employing both capital and labor. In
particular, the supply of any product requires a ￿xed input requirement in terms
of f units of capital and a variable input requirement in terms of e¢ ciency units
of labor. Firms enter and exit the market freely so that at any time the expected
pro￿t from entry is capitalized in the value Vs of each of the f units of capital
a ￿rm needs to start production.
The capital stock evolves through time driven by depreciation and invest-
ment in capital accumulation. The supply of new capital takes place under
perfect competition. A new unit of capital is produced by employing fI e¢ -
ciency units of labor and becomes available for production with a one-period
time-to-build lag. In every period all units of capital face the same probability
￿ 2 (0;1) of being destroyed. This implies that a fraction ￿ of the capital stock
is destroyed every period or, equivalently, the capital stock depreciates at rate ￿.
The exogenous destruction shock occurs after production and investment have
taken place at the very end of the time period. Therefore, a fraction ￿ of new
units of capital never becomes available for goods production.
While all ￿rms face the same ￿xed capital requirement f, their labor re-
quirements per unit of output varies depending on their individual productivity,
which they get to know only after entering the market by hiring capital. Firm
productivity is determined as follows. At the beginning of period s there are:
(1 ￿ ￿)Ks￿1 "old" units of capital that were already avaliable at time s ￿ 1,
plus (1 ￿ ￿)Is￿1=Vs￿1 "new" units of capital accumulated through investment
Is￿1 at time s ￿ 1 by paying the corresponding price Vs￿1. In order to enter
the market in period s, potential ￿rms competitively bid for the available units
of capital Ks = (1 ￿ ￿)(Ks￿1 + Is￿1=Vs￿1).
Due to the ￿xed capital requirement f, only Ks=f ￿rms are eventually able
to enter. Once capital has been allocated to the winning bidders, entrants
7are assigned their unit labor requirement c (in e¢ ciency units) as a random
draw from a common time invariant continuous di⁄erentiable distribution with
c.d.f. G(c) over the support [0;cM]. Based on their draws, entrants then decide
whether to produce or not. Letting Ns and ￿s respectively denote the mass
("number") and the share of entrants that decide to produce, the former equals
Ns = ￿sKs=f.
Given this set of assumptions, individual investment, bond holdings and










s and Y c
s = Dsxc
s + Wsz, where xc
s is the individual share of the
capital stock, yc
s is the individual share of bonds, Ds is the aggregate dividend
paid by entrants that decide to produce, Vs is the (ex-dividend) value of a unit
of capital, and Ws is the wage per e¢ ciency unit. The intertemporal budget



























3.1 Consumption and Investment
The utility maximization problem can be solved by the Lagrangian method.
































































The FOC with respect to qc
s(!) requires
￿










8Note that s = t implies that ￿ equals the initial marginal utility of consumption










the instantaneous inverse demand for product ! can be written as
￿ ￿ ￿qc
s(!) ￿ ￿Qc
s = ￿sps(!) (7)
with Euler condition
￿Es f(1 + is+1)￿s+1g = ￿s (8)







which shows that ￿ > ￿se ps with e ps = Ps=Ns has to hold if any consumption
has to take place at all (Qc
s > 0).
















are not bought (qc
s(!) = 0). Individual inverse demand for product ! can then
be written as
















The associated elasticity of demand is an increasing function of the own price

























1In the static quasi-linear case of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), the marginal utility of
income is ￿ = 1.
9It is also an increasing function of the number of consumers L and the marginal
utility of income as well as a decreasing function of the quantity demanded qs(!)
and the extent of product di⁄erentiation ￿. Note that the impact of changing
ps is stronger for higher ps(!). In turn, going back to (10), the choke price ps
is a decreasing function of the marginal utility of income ￿s and the number of
producers Ns as well as a decreasing function of their average price e ps. Hence,
any increase (decrease) in the marginal utility of income and the number of
producers as well as any decrease (increase) in their average price leads to a rise
(fall) in the elasticity of demand. This makes competition tougher (softer) for
all ￿rms but disproportionately so for high price ￿rms.
3.1.2 Investment Decision
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which, by (5), can be rewritten as the no-arbitrage condition









which states that there are no pro￿ts to be made by arbitraging between bonds
and capital.
3.2 Goods Production and Dividends
Pro￿t maximization in goods production requires marginal revenue to match
marginal cost. Given total inverse demand (11), the FOC for pro￿t maximiza-










such that qs(cs) = 0 and only ￿rms whose unit labor requirement satis￿es c ￿ cs
end up producing. The share of entrants that decide to produce therefore equals










10which can be plugged into total inverse demand (11) to obtain the corresponding
price, markup, revenue and pro￿t:
ps(c) = Ws
2 (cs + c) ￿s(c) = Ws
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2 (16)
Pro￿t is equally shared as dividends among the f units of capital hired by the
￿rm. More productive ￿rms have lower value of c. They are, therefore, bigger
in terms of both output and revenues. They quote lower prices but have higher
markups. As higher markups are associated with larger output, more productive
￿rms also generate more pro￿ts. A lower cuto⁄cs reduces the price, the output,
the revenues and the pro￿ts of all ￿rms. As it increases the elasticity of demand,
it also reduces the markup, which makes cs an inverse measure of the toughness
of competition.
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(17)
where e cs labels the average unit labor requirement of goods producers, i.e.
the mean unit labor requirement calculated for the conditional distribution
G(c)=G(cs) as only ￿rms with c ￿ cs produce. Analogously, average revenues
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0 c2dGs(c) with e ￿
2
s denoting the conditional variance. Note
that, in the above expressions, the conditional mean e cs and variance e ￿
2
s are both
functions of cs only.2





￿s￿sWs (cs ￿ e cs)
(20)
2Average revenue e rs = Rs=Ns and average dividend e ds = Ds=Ns di⁄er from the revenue
and pro￿t of the average ￿rm due to additive terms that depend on the variance e ￿2
s.
11which shows that Ks > 0 requires ￿ > ￿sWscs. All the rest given, a larger
number of producers (larger ￿sKs=f) is associated with tougher competition
(lower cs).
3.3 Capital Accumulation and Aggregation
Perfect competition in capital production implies that capital is priced at mar-
ginal cost:
Vs = WsfI (21)
while depreciation implies that the capital stock follows the law of motion







where Is=Vs is labor employed in capital accumulation.
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= WsLzs ￿ (Rs ￿ Ds)
which shows that investment equals the aggregate wage bill minus the wages
paid to labor employed in goods production (Rs￿Ds). Equivalently, investment
is what is left of wage income WsLzs and dividend income Ds after paying for
consumption expenditure Rs. Accordingly (22) can be rewritten as
Ks+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
Ks +






















which highlights that individual welfare depends on total consumption (Qc
s),
product variety (Ns = Ks￿s=f) and the concentration of the consumption bun-
dle across available products (inversely measured by Var(qc
s)). As marginal util-
ity decreases in the consumption of each product, more concentration (smaller
12Var(qc
s)) is bad for consumption. At the same time it is good for income through
a productivity reallocation e⁄ect due to the corresponding concentration of re-
sources on the supply of varieties by the most e¢ cient ￿rms. Expression (2)
then shows that the latter e⁄ect dominates.
3.5 Parametrization of Technology
All the results derived so far hold for any distribution of unit labor requirement
draws G(c). However, in order to simplify some of the ensuing analysis, it is
useful to introduce a speci￿c and empirically relevant parametrization for this
distribution. In particular, it is assumed that individual productivity draws
1=c follow a Pareto distribution with lower productivity bound 1=cM and shape







; c 2 [0;cM]: (25)
The shape parameter k indexes the dispersion of unit labor requirement draws.
When k = 1, the unit labor requirement distribution is uniform on [0;cM] with
maximum dispersion. As k increases, the relative number of high unit labor re-
quirement ￿rms increases, and the unit labor requirement distribution becomes
more concentrated at these higher unit labor requirement levels. As k goes
to in￿nity, the distribution becomes degenerate at cM and dispersion vanishes.
Hence, k can be interpreted as an inverse measure of ￿rm heterogeneity. Any
truncation of the unit labor requirement distribution from above retains the
same distribution function and shape parameter k. The productivity distribu-
tion of surviving ￿rms is therefore also Pareto with shape k, and the truncated
unit labor requirement distribution is given by Gs(c) = (c=cs)
k, c 2 [0;cs].
Given this distributional assumption, the fraction of entrants that produce,





























Rs = (k + 1)Ds (29)
Accordingly, employment in goods production is Ls = (Rs ￿ Ds)=Ws = kDs=Ws.
13Moreover, average price, markup and output from (17) boil down to
e ps = Ps
Ns = 2k+1
2(k+1)Wscs








To sum up, at time s, the equilibrium of the model is characterized by seven
conditions. Three are the dynamic conditions (8), (13), and (23). The other
four are the static conditions (21), (27), (28) and (29). These can be combined
to yield the following system of ￿ve equations




























There are six endogenous variables (￿, i, W, R, K, c). The characterization
of the equilibrium is completed by choosing an e¢ ciency unit of labor as the
numeraire good (Ws+1 = Ws = 1).
Turning to welfare, instantaneous indirect utility has a neat expression. In
particular, substituting the utility maximizing consumption choices into (2),


























Instantaneous utility Us is, therefore, a decreasing function of ￿s and cs.
4 Deterministic Steady State
In steady state ￿s+1 = ￿s = ￿, is+1 = is = i, Ks+1 = Ks = K, cs+1 = cs = c,
zs = z, where z is the mean value of zs. Under these conditions, equations (31)

















These imply steady state dividends and employment in goods production are
D = R=(k+1) and L = R￿D = kD=z respectively. In steady state, the number
14of entrants is then equal to K=f while the number of producers evaluates to
N = (c=cM)
k K=f, with ￿ = (c=cM)










Given K and W, equations (32) (implicitly) determine the unique steady-
state cuto⁄ unit labor requirement c and marginal utility of income ￿. To see
this, rewrite (32) as
￿ =











k fc + ￿Kck+1 (36)
Both these expressions represent ￿ as positive decreasing functions of c with (35)
everywhere steeper than (36). Given that the former lies above the latter in a
neighbourhood of c = 0, they must cross and this happens only once at some
positive value of c. This value belongs to the relevant support [0;cM] provided









grants existence and uniqueness of the steady state.3














Then, based on (1), steady state intertemporal indirect utility equals the present
value of the constant ￿ ow (38) discounted at rate ￿.
As (32) do not lend themselves to explicit analytical solution, some compar-
ative statics results around the steady state can be obtained graphically after
rewriting (35) and (36) as follows
￿c =











k f + ￿Kck (40)
Figures 1 provides a graphical representation of the determination of ￿c and
c for given K and W, with (39) being the steeper curve and (40) being the
3Intuitively, the condition for existence and uniqueness of the steady state requires (35) to
be below (36) at c = cM.
15￿ atter one associating ￿c = ￿ to c = 0. The fact that along the steeper curve
(39) ￿c goes to in￿nity when c tends to zero con￿rms that there exist unique
equilibrium values for ￿c and c (and therefore for ￿) provided that (37) holds.
The focus here is on the e⁄ects of a permanent shock to labor productivity.
For concreteness, consider an exogenous increase in z. The e⁄ect of lower z
will be clearly symmetric. Figure 1 shows the e⁄ects of larger z. The initial
situation is represented by the two solid curves. Given (34), larger z drives K
up while the ratio R=K remains unchanged. This implies that, whereas (39)
does not move, (40) shifts downwards to its new dashed position. As a result
the equilibrium value of ￿c falls whereas the equilibrium value of c rises, thus
reducing the toughness of competition. Accordingly, higher labor productivity
raises the number of entrants (K=f increases) as well as the number of producers
((c=cM)
k K=f increases) due to both more entry (larger K=f) and a higher
survival rate for entrants (larger (c=cM)
k). Given (30), by raising c, higher
labor productivity is associated with higher average price and average markup
as well as with lower average output. Given (38), by decreasing ￿c higher labor
productivity is also associated with higher welfare.
5 Local Transitionary Dynamics
The local dynamic properties of the model can be analyzed through lineariza-
tion around its non-stochastic steady state to show how the economy reacts to
productivity shocks.
5.1 Log-Linearization





=X ￿ dlnX around the steady state give the following linear












Second, under the assumption that (1 + is)￿s is lognormally distributed, the
log-linearization of the Euler equation in (31) around the steady state yields:
Es￿1 fln￿sg ￿ ln￿s￿1 = ￿
￿





where ￿0 ￿ 1





￿ln￿. The focus is on the dynamic response to shocks rather than on trend
movements, so the constant ￿0 is omitted henceforth. In terms of deviations
from steady state one can then rewrite
Es￿1 fdln￿sg ￿ dln￿s￿1 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))(Es￿1 fdlnRsg ￿ dlnKs) (42)
16where the interest rate has been substituted out using the following linear ap-
proximation of the no-arbitrage condition in (31) around the steady state
dln(1 + is) = (1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))(dlnRs ￿ dlnKs)
Third, linearization of (32) around the steady state yields the system








which can be solve by Cramer rule to obtain
dlncs = ￿
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dln￿s ￿
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The latter can then be substituted into (41) and (42) to yield
dlnKs+1 ￿ dlnKs =



























Es￿1 fdln￿sg ￿ dln￿s￿1 =
(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿+k￿c
(k+1)￿￿k￿c
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(k+1)￿￿k￿c
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(k+1)￿￿k￿c
dlnKs
Equations (44) and (45) constitute a system of two linear stochastic di⁄er-
ence equations in the percentage deviations of the capital stock (dlnKs) and of
the marginal utility of income (dln￿s) from steady state with the percentage
productivity shock (dlnzs) as exogenous forcing variable. The system is closed
by assuming the following speci￿c process for this shock
dlnzs = ￿zdlnzs￿1 + ￿s (46)
where ￿s is independent normally distributed white noise disturbance with mean
zero.
175.2 Stability
Forwarding (45) by one period and substituting for dlnKs+1 from (44) in the
forwarded expression yields


































Abstracting from the random shocks (i.e. imposing dlnzs = 0), standard phase
diagram analysis reveals that the dynamics of the system de￿ned by (44) and
(47) exhibit saddle path properties whenever the slope of the locus (Ks;￿s) such
that dlnKs+1 = dlnKs is larger than the slope of the locus (Ks;￿s) such that
dln￿s+1 = dln￿s. This is always the case given that ￿ > ￿c has to hold for
K > 0 (see (20)).
5.3 Undetermined coe¢ cients
The stochastic system can be solved by the method of undetermined coe¢ cients
conjecturing a solution of the form
dln￿s = ￿KdlnKs + ￿zdlnzs
To see this, de￿ne the bundling parameters a￿, ak, az and b￿, bk, bz that allow
(44) and (47) to be rewritten as
dlnKs+1 = a￿dln￿s + (1 + ak)dlnKs + azdlnzs
Es fdln￿s+1g = (1 + b￿)dln￿s + bkdlnKs + bzdlnzs
Substituting in the conjectured solution and the processes of the productivity
shock (46) yields
dlnKs+1 = (1 + ak + a￿￿K)dlnKs + (az + a￿￿z)dlnzs
dlnKs+1 =
bk + (1 + b￿)￿K
￿K
dlnKs +
(bz ￿ ￿z￿z) + (1 + b￿)￿z
￿K
dlnzs
Then the conjectured solution is indeed correct if its coe¢ cients ￿K and ￿z
jointly satisfy the following conditions
1 + ak + a￿￿K =
bk + (1 + b￿)￿K
￿K
(48)
az + a￿￿z =
(bz ￿ ￿z￿z) + (1 + b￿)￿z
￿K
These de￿ne a system of two equations in two unknowns, ￿K and ￿z. Using the
values that solve this system, one can characterize the transitionary dynamics
18in a neighbourhood of the steady state forced by the productivity shock dlnzs.
Then, the evolution of the capital stock and the marginal utility of income r
periods after the shock can be described by
dlnKs = 0; dlnKs+r = ￿s (az + a￿￿z)e(ak+a￿￿K+￿z)(r￿1), r = 1;:::;1 (49)
dln￿s+r = ￿KdlnKs+r + ￿zdlnzs+r, r = 0;:::;1 (50)
with
dlnzs = ￿s; dlnzs+r =
￿
0 if ￿z = 0
￿se(￿z￿1)r if ￿z 6= 0
, r = 1;::;1
where ￿z = 0 corresponds to a temporary shock
5.4 Numerical analysis
The aim of this section is not to perform a full-￿ edged calibration exercise. It
is rather to propose a numerical exploration of how ￿rm heterogeneity a⁄ects
the propagation of exogenous technology shocks.
Firm heterogeneity is regulated by the shape parameter k of the Pareto
distribution: the larger k, the smaller the degree of ￿rm heterogeneity as the
population of ￿rms becomes increasingly concentrated at low e¢ ciency levels.
Figures 2 to 8 depict the e⁄ects of a 10% temporary increase in labor pro-
ductivity ￿s. The ￿gures are drawn by simulating the model for the following
parameter values: ￿ = 10, ￿ = 10, ￿ = 10, cM = 10, f = 1, L = 100, ￿ = 0:025,
￿ = 0:99, fI = 1, z = 1. The values of ￿ and ￿ are borrowed from Bilbiie,
Ghironi and Melitz (2007). They correspond to the interpretation of a time
period as a quarter and have been chosen for expositionary concreteness. In all
￿gures the e⁄ects of the productivity shock are described for three alternative
values of the Pareto shape parameter, corresponding to k = 2, k = 3 and k = 4.
Formally, Figures 2, 3 and 4 are based on (49), (50) and (43) respectively.
Figures 5 plots dln￿s = kdlncs, as implied by (26). Figure 6 portrays dlnNs =
kdlncs + dlnKs, as implied by Ns = (cs=cM)kKs. The Her￿ndahl Index of










where ss (c) = rs(c)=Rs is the market share of a ￿rm with unit labor requirement
c. Finally, Figure 8 represents
dlnUs = ￿
￿






￿(k + 2) + (k + 1)￿c
￿ (dln￿s + dlncs)
as obtained by linearizing (33) around the steady state.
On impact (period 0 in the ￿gures) the capital stock and, therefore, the
number of entrants is ￿xed. All adjustment is then loaded onto the marginal
19utility of income that stimulates demand by falling below its steady state level.
Higher demand raises pro￿ts, allowing additional less productive entrants to
produce. The cuto⁄ and the success rate rise accordingly. Even if the number
of entrants is unchanged, the higher success rate implies a larger number of
producers. As a result, market concentration falls and welfare rises. Higher
pro￿ts also raise investment in the accumulation of new capital that will become
available at the beginning of the next period.
In the ￿rst period after the shock (period 1 in the ￿gures), newly accumu-
lated capital is in place making additional entry possible. This feeds into addi-
tional producers, lower market concentration and higher welfare, even though
additional entry pushes both the cuto⁄ and the success rate below their steady
state levels. At the same time, the marginal utility of income starts increasing
towards its long run level.
In the subsequent periods the marginal utility of income keeps on increasing
and demand keeps on falling. Producers then leave the market; the cuto⁄, the
success rate and market concentration rise; the capital stock, the number of
entrants and welfare fall back to their steady state values.
Comparing the curves corresponding to di⁄erent values of k across the ￿gures
allows one to gauge the role played by ￿rm heterogeneity. In all ￿gures larger
values of k are associated with ￿ uctuations of smaller amplitude, revealing that
more heterogeneity is associated with smaller e⁄ects of the exogenous produc-
tivity shocks. Accordingly, existing studies ￿nding that with representative
￿rms procyclical entry and exit in imperfectly competitive markets can act as a
powerful propagation mechanism of technology shocks (see, e.g., Jaimovich and
Floetotto, 2008, and Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz, 2007) may actually overstate
the role of entry and exit as an ampli￿cation mechanism during the business
cycle. The reason is that procyclical entry and countercyclical exit dispro-
portionately involve low e¢ ciency ￿rms, whose importance for the aggregate
economy is limited by their small size. More generally, these ￿ndings suggest
that the role of entry and exit as a propagation mechanism of technology shocks
cannot be fully assessed without simultaneously considering ￿rm heterogeneity.
As a ￿nal comment, it is interesting to stress the evolution of the average
markup, average ￿rm e¢ ciency and CPI-de￿ ated wage per worker. Both the
average markup and average ￿rm e¢ ciency change one to one with the cut-
o⁄ cs. However, whereas the former increases when the cuto⁄ increases, the
latter decreases when the cuto⁄ increases. As the cuto⁄ moves procyclically
on impact, countercyclically after one period, and procyclically again after-
wards, also the average markup follows the same evolution. By symmetry,
average e¢ ciency moves instead countercyclically on impact, procyclically af-
ter one period and countercyclically again afterwards. Turning to wage per




ps(c)ss (c)dGs(c) with ss (c) = rs(c)=Rs. Under the Pareto assump-
tions, it boils down to CPIs = cs
￿
6k + 2k2 + 3
￿
=[2(k + 1)(k + 3)]. Hence,
the percentage deviation of the CPI-de￿ ated real wage Wszs=CPIs from steady
state evaluates locally to dlnzs ￿dlncs = ￿s ￿dlncs upon impact and ￿dlncs
20afterwards. Its evolution is depicted in Figure 9, which shows that the real
wage moves procyclically on impact and countercyclically afterwards. These
alternating responses due to compositional changes in the presence of heteroge-
neous imperfectly competitive ￿rms may help explain why the empirical debate
on the cyclical properties of markups and real wages is still pretty much open.
6 Conclusion
This paper has Introduced ￿rm heterogeneity in a standard two-sector growth
model to study the propagation of exogenous technology shocks. Focusing on
how the proposed model reacts changes in the number of e¢ ciency units per
worker has revealed that, during business cycle upswings, on impact there is
more entry, more survival after entry, and surviving ￿rms are on average less
e¢ cient and smaller. The opposite is true during downswings. This is due to
the fact that new producers and quitters are less e¢ cient than incumbents. The
resulting pro-cyclical entry and the countercyclical exit of less e¢ cient ￿rms
reduce the impact of exogenous technology shocks on aggregate output per
worker and welfare. Due to variable demand elasticity, the dampening e⁄ect of
￿rm selection on aggregate productivity and welfare works also through a second
channel. Holding the number of incumbents constant, in an upswing industry
concentration decreases as market shares are reallocated towards less e¢ cient
￿rms due to the fact that the elasticity of demand falls more for high-price ￿rms
than for low-price ones. In a downswing the opposite happens.
It has been shown that the dampening e⁄ect of ￿rm selection depends on
the degree of ￿rm heterogeneity, with the impact of changes in the number of
e¢ ciency units per worker on aggregate output per worker and welfare being
stronger the less heterogeneous ￿rms are. This reveals a way through which
microeconomic heterogeneity may crucially a⁄ect the propagation of aggregate
shocks. Speci￿cally, it implies that existing models with representative ￿rms
may overstate the actual role of procyclical entry and exit in imperfectly com-
petitive markets as a propagation mechanism of technology shocks. The reason
is that pro-cyclical entry and countercyclical exit disproportionately involve less
e¢ cient ￿rms whose impact on the aggregate is hampered by their smaller size.
These ￿nding need not be taken to imply that, as ine¢ cient ￿rms are typi-
cally small, variations in their number are of limited practical relevance. Indeed,
variations in the number of ￿rms are only one of the channels that generate ac-
tual changes in the number of competitors. In particular, a new establishment
or franchise by an existing ￿rm increase the number of competitors without
a⁄ecting the number of active ￿rms. What the ￿ndings do imply is, instead,
that the role of entry and exit as a propagation mechanism of technology shocks
cannot be fully assessed without simultaneously considering ￿rm heterogeneity.
The analysis has focused on a numerical investigation of transitionary dy-
namics that falls short of a full-￿ edged calibration exercise. It would be natural
to explore the ability of the model to reproduce key moments of the data. It
would also be interesting to extend the model to the open economy in order to
21study the international transmissions of country speci￿c shocks.
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Figure 1 - Higher Labor Productivity:  





Figure 2 – Transitory Positive Labor Productivity Shock:  
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Figure 3 – Transitory Positive Labor Productivity Shock:  





Figure 4 – Transitory Positive Labor Productivity Shock:  
Response of Cutoff  (Markup) 
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Figure 5 – Transitory Positive Labor Productivity Shock:  





Figure 6 – Transitory Positive Labor Productivity Shock:  
Response of the Number of Producers  
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Figure 7 – Transitory Positive Labor Productivity Shock:  





Figure 8 – Transitory Positive Labor Productivity Shock:  
Response of the Instantaneous Utility  
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Figure 9 – Transitory Positive Labor Productivity Shock:  
Response of the Real Wage  
 
 